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This paper examines the welfare implications of a country joining a currency union as 
opposed to operating in a flexible exchange rate regime. At the country level, the 
suboptimal response to domestic and foreign shocks and the inability of setting inflation at 
the desired level may be offset by a positive impact on potential output. We show that for 
entry to be welfare enhancing, the potential output gain must be the larger, the smaller the 
country, the larger the difference between the standard deviation of supply shocks across 
the participating countries, the smaller the correlation of countries’ supply shocks and the 
larger the variance of real exchange rate shocks. 
 Non-Technical Summary
The birth of a single currency in Europe and the prospects for future
expansions of the euro area shed a new light over the debate on the optimal
composition of currency unions.
The traditional view, inspired by the early optimal currency area lit-
erature (see Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; Kenen 1969), stresses the
importance that countries belonging to a common currency area are highly
integrated among each other. The motivation for this is that a high de-
gree of integration, for example in terms of trade, might help reduce the
likelihood of asymmetric shocks and unsyncronised business cycles. While
this line of reasoning has been re￿ned and critically discussed over the years
(e.g. Corden, 1972; Mundell 1973), it has remained, until recently at least,
the mainstream view. This consensus, however, has been challenged by the
in￿ uential empirical analysis of Rose (2001, 2002, 2004), which ￿nds strong
evidence of a positive impact of currency unions on trade. This, as well as
the experience with currency unions, has led some analysts to assess more
positively the possibility of a country joining a currency union even before
full economic integration is achieved.
The aim of this paper is to review some of these argumentations on
the basis of a stylised theoretical approach, which explicitly incorporates
(i) the real exchange rate appreciation process which typically characterises
catching up countries (by reviewing the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect) and (ii)
the positive impact of currency unions on potential output, as identi￿ed by
the work originated by Rose. Our motivation is partly theoretical and partly
to adapt the standard analysis to the case of catching up countries, which
has generally been ignored in this context.
We examine ￿rst the welfare implications for the currency union as a
whole. We show that the expected loss of common currency union does not
depend on the deterministic factors a⁄ecting the real exchange rate (such
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of supply shocks. We also show that, if the transmission mechanisms of
monetary policy di⁄er among member states, the expected loss of the com-
mon currency area depends on the variance of real exchange rate shocks (i.e.
intersectoral productivity, aggregate demand and purchasing power parity
shocks).
The presence of members undergoing structural change could have there-
fore negative welfare implications for the common currency union to the
extent that this is re￿ ected in high variances of aggregate supply and real
exchange rate shocks. There is, however, an important quali￿cation to be
made. These variances are weighted by the square of the size of each partic-
ipant to the union. Thus, a relatively high variance of shocks in one country
has a limited impact on the union insofar as this country is not too large. We
also ￿nd that the smaller the covariance of aggregate supply shocks between
the two countries, the smaller the aggregate loss. The intuition for this is
that the less supply shocks are correlated, the more they tend to o⁄set each
other at the union level.
At the country level, joining a currency union necessarily implies an
ine¢ cient response to domestic and foreign shocks as well as a loss of con-
trol over average in￿ ation. This notwithstanding, it may be bene￿cial to
join a currency union as long as the gain in potential output is su¢ ciently
large. Under the simplifying assumption that the transmission mechanisms
of monetary policy is the same between countries, the gain in potential out-
put must be the larger, the smaller the country, the larger the di⁄erence
between the standard deviation of supply shocks in the two participating
countries, the smaller the correlation of supply shocks and the larger the
variance of real exchange rate shocks. Therefore a country characterised by
sizeable asymmetric shocks may still bene￿t from joining a currency union,
if the potential output gain is su¢ ciently large.
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The birth of a single currency in Europe and the prospects for future ex-
pansions of the euro area shed a new light over the debate on the optimal
composition of currency unions.
The traditional view, inspired by the early optimal currency area lit-
erature (see Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; Kenen 1969), stresses the
importance that countries belonging to a common currency area are highly
integrated among each other. The motivation for this is that a high degree
of integration, for example in terms of trade, might help reduce the likeli-
hood of asymmetric shocks and unsyncronised business cycles. While this
line of reasoning has been re￿ned and critically discussed over the years (e.g.
Corden, 1972; Mundell 1973), it has remained, until recently at least, the
mainstream view.1
This consensus, however, has been challenged by the in￿ uential empirical
analysis of Rose (2001, 2002, 2004), which ￿nds strong evidence of a positive
impact of currency unions on trade. The positive impact on potential output
via trade and ￿nancial integration,2 as well as the experience with currency
unions, has led some analysts to assess more positively the possibility of a
country joining a currency union even before full economic integration is
achieved.
The key questions underlying this debate can be summarised as follows:
What are the consequences of renouncing to an independent monetary policy
for in￿ ation and output in a small open economy? How is this choice a⁄ected
by the catching up process and by the role of external shocks? And what are
the welfare implications of joining a currency union, and more speci￿cally,
1For recent reviews of optimal currency areas literature see Mongelli (2002), Horvath
(2003) and Artis (2004).
2Bagella, et al. (2004) investigate the direct output impact of EMU. They ￿nd that: (i)
reduced exchange rate volatility (ii) higher and less heterogenous quality of institutional
rules and (iii) more stable macroeconomic policies have had a signi￿cant impact on the
level and growth rates of per capita GDP in euro area countries.
7
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exchange rate, such as aggregate demand and PPP shocks?3
A satisfactory answer to all these questions requires addressing at least
￿ve crucial issues. First, one needs a macroeconomic framework de￿ning
the relationship between nominal and real variables, which in turn critically
depends on the shape of the aggregate supply.
Second, one needs to make an overall assessment on what determines po-
tential output and its endogeneity with respect to the exchange rate regime.
According to the growth literature, catching up is ￿ conditional￿on a number
of factors among which institutional factors,4 and the exchange rate regime
may play a role. Moreover, following the in￿ uential analysis of Rose (2000,
2001, 2004),5 the elimination of exchange rate risks and the formation of a
currency union are often viewed as having a positive impact on long term
growth prospects,6 due to deeper integration of trade and ￿nancial markets.7
Third, one should consider the possible link between real exchange rate
and intersectoral productivity growth. The disaggregation of potential out-
put across sectors is important, because it provides useful insights on in￿ a-
tion. Starting point is the appealing stylised fact that whenever countries
successfully catch up, productivity growth tends to be higher in the trad-
3There is a considerable ongoing debate, applied especially to the case of Central and
Eastern European countries, to what extent the BS model explains the causes of real
appreciation processes in fast-growing small open economies as opposed to other factors,
such as demand factors, the liberalisation of prices and undervalued exchange rates at the
beginning of the process (see Egert et. al, 2003; MacDonald and Wojcik, 2004;
and Klau, 2004).
4Durlauf and Quah (1999) provide an exaustive survey on recent empirical evidence on
what factors, both economic and institutional, a⁄ect economic growth.
5The size of the currency union e⁄ect on international trade is controversial in the
literature, but it is generally accepted to be positive. For a meta-analysis see Rose (2004).
6An opposite theoretical e⁄ect may be in action if a currency union encourages a wage
equalisation process across countries that is not supported by corresponding improvements
in productivity. In a similar vein, Cukierman and Lippi (2001) discuss the possibility that
currency unions increase labour-unions wage demands for any given level of productivity.
7Edwards and Magendzo (2003), have recently quali￿ed these results by stressing the
need to distinguish between countries which ￿ dollarise￿from those participating to a fully
￿ edged currency union, concluding that only in the latter case one can ￿nd evidence of a
positive impact on growth.
8
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Mihaljekable than in the non-tradable sector. Under a standard set of assumptions,
this implies that successfully catching up countries face a real exchange rate
appreciation vis-￿-vis trading partners (Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 1964),8
hence a higher in￿ ation if the exchange rate is ￿xed.9
Fourth, one should take into account that countries forming a monetary
union lose direct control of domestic in￿ ation.
Fifth, in judging the impact of the exchange rate framework, one needs
to assess the macroeconomic impact of economic shocks. Besides the tradi-
tional debate on the importance of shocks on the velocity of money versus
real shocks in determining the optimal exchange rate regime,10 the literature
frequently focuses upon the role played by asymmetric supply shocks but
generally ignores the role played by real exchange rate shocks.11
In this paper, by taking into account these ￿ve issues, we develop a
stylised two-sector, two-country general equilibrium model, in which we as-
sume that the large developed country conducts an independent monetary
policy and the relatively low-income, small-open economy has the option of
forming a monetary union. The framework extends the set up in Ca￿Zorzi
and De Santis (2004, 2005) by modelling explicitly the variables a⁄ecting
the real exchange rate deterministically (e.g. the BS e⁄ect) and by pos-
8High productivity growth in the tradable sector relative to the non-tradable sector
leads to higher real wages in the tradable sector of fast-growing countries. Assuming
labour mobility across sectors and for a given world price for tradables, the relative price
of non-tradables must necessarily increase to keep the marginal product of labour equal
to the real wage in the non-tradable sector. Thus, countries growing more rapidly are
generally expected to face a more sizeable real exchange rate appreciation. This e⁄ect is
known in the literature as the BS e⁄ect.
9The implications of the BS e⁄ect has recently been assessed by a number of authors,
including Sinn and Reutter (2001) for the euro area, De Broeck and Slok (2001) and
Halpern and Wyplosz (2001) for transition countries and Devereux (1999) and Ito, Isard
and Symansky (1999) for Asia.
10For example the traditional Poole￿ s analysis emphasises the importance of the relative
variance of money demand and output demand shocks in deciding whether to adopt a ￿xed
or a ￿ exible exchange rate regime. Fixed exchange rates help stabilising money demand
shock , while ￿ exible exchange rates help stabilising output shocks (Poole, 1970).
11For a theoretical perspective within a common currency area see for example Cooper
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stulating, in line with the empirical evidence, a positive impact of currency
unions on potential output. In addition, the modelling framework considers
two country-speci￿c shocks: aggregate supply shocks and, what is generally
ignored, real exchange rate shocks.12
The remaining sections of the paper have been organised as follows: Sec-
tion 2 describes the two-sector, two-country general equilibrium model and
derives a Lucas-type supply curve; Section 3 introduces the loss function for
the central banker and examines the implications for output and in￿ ation of
a ￿ exible exchange rates versus a currency union regime; Section 4 investi-
gates the welfare implications of renouncing to a national currency. Section
5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 A simple framework.
In this section we present a stylised two-sector, two-country general equilib-
rium model that incorporates factors determining the real exchange rate and,
at the same time, yields a Lucas supply function. Monetary non-neutrality
is introduced by having the nominal wage set prior to the realisation of
shocks.
The structure of the model for both countries is consistent with a ￿ syn-
thetic view￿of the world, admitting in other words the existence of a trade
o⁄ between in￿ ation and output, while denying any relationship over the
long term. The implicit assumption is therefore that the loss of monetary
policy control may be harmful in the short run, but bears no consequences
on output over a long run horizon. We also assume that the small open
economy ful￿ls the necessary conditions for catching up relative to the large
country and, as in the BS literature, that growth is biased toward the trad-
able sector.
12As shown later, in this framework real exchange rate shocks encompass: (i) unan-
ticipated changes in relative productivity between the traded and non-traded sectors (ii)
aggregate demand shocks (iii) shocks to PPP in the tradable sector.
10
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Let us de￿ne the fast growing small open economy as country h and the large
economy as country f, both producing traded goods (T) and non-traded
goods (N). These are indexed, respectively, with r = h;f and i = T;N.
The model is in logs and all variables are interpreted as growth rates unless
stated otherwise. Consumers allocate their expenditure between traded and
non-traded goods as follows:
yr = ￿ryT
r + (1 ￿ ￿r)yN
r ; (1)
where ￿r denotes the share of the traded goods in the consumer basket.
With this speci￿cation the CPI in￿ ation rate is given by a weighed av-
erage of the price of traded goods, pT




r + (1 ￿ ￿r)pN
r ; (2)
while the sectoral demand for goods, yi
r, depends only on relative prices:
yi






2.2 The supply side
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r + (1 ￿ ￿r)aN
r is aggregate productivity in country r.
The sectoral demands for labour are derived by equating the marginal




r ￿ wr; (6)
where wr is the nominal wage rate, which is equalised across sectors. The




















r , (7) implies lT
r = lN
r = lr. In
other words, relative prices adjust so as to prevent a change in the sectoral












If productivity growth in the traded sector is greater than in the non-traded
sector, the relative price for non-traded goods increases. This result is the
￿rst main proposition of the BS model. Positive aggregate demand shocks
also temporary raise the relative price for non-traded goods if bN
r > bT
r .14
13Combining these two expressions amounts to ￿nding the tangency point between the
production possibility frontier and the consumer￿ s indi⁄erent curves under the assumption
that the traded sector always clears, namely that the current account balance is always
zero (or, alternatively, a constant proportion of output).
14De Gregorio, et al. (1994) show that in several european countries (i) demand shifts
towards the nontradable sector, (ii) real wage pressures and (iii) productivity growth in
the traded good sector were the key variables explaining the increase in the relative price
of nontradable goods. Similarly, MacDonald and Wojcik (2004) argue that the price
ratio between non-tradable and tradable goods not only depends on relative productivity
across sectors but also on demand factors. Additionaly, they argue that the assumption of
purchasing power parity is too restrictive for catching up countries. The impact of similar
aggregate demand shocks in a context is
shown in Cova (2004).
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ew open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) n2.3 Real exchange rate determination
In the standard version of the BS model, it is assumed that PPP holds
for the tradable sector. Here we extend the analysis slightly by allowing





f is traded goods in￿ ation determined within the large
country and e is the change in the nominal exchange rate. By construction
we assume instead that qT
f = 0. Taking into account also (8) we can now
rewrite (2) as follows:
ph = pT
f + e + ￿h (9)
pf = pT
f + ￿f; (10)
















Therefore, in￿ ation in the small open economy can be decomposed into
three components: imported in￿ ation, pT
f , exchange-rate-induced in￿ ation,
e, and structural in￿ ation, ￿h. By structural in￿ ation we mean the com-
ponent of in￿ ation determined by consumer preferences, by di⁄erences in
productivity across the traded and non-traded sectors, by aggregate de-
mand e⁄ects and PPP deviations. Let us also de￿ne ￿r ￿ ￿r ￿ E (￿r) as
the country-speci￿c shock to structural in￿ ation, where E (￿r) denotes the
deterministic component of structural in￿ ation in country r, being E(:::) the
expectations operator.
By using (9) and (10), and by de￿ning the change in the real exchange
rate as s = pf + e ￿ ph, we derive:
s = ￿(￿h ￿ ￿f): (11)
If structural in￿ ation is higher in the home country (i.e. ￿h > ￿f), the real
exchange rate of the home country appreciates.
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We introduce a nominal rigidity in wage setting in a standard way. Fol-
lowing e.g. Rogo⁄ (1985), Blanchard and Fisher (1989), or Cooley and
Hansen (1995), we assume the existence in each country of a union setting
the economy-wide nominal wage so as to minimise the expected deviation
of aggregate employment lr from its long run ￿ exible-wage level ￿ lr:
wr = argminE
￿
lr ￿ ￿ lr
￿2 : (12)
The nominal wage is set prior to the realisation of shocks and it is as-
sumed that workers are prepared to meet any demand for labour required
by ￿rms after the realisation of shocks. This feature, which is standard in
the literature originates from distortions in the labour market (e.g. monop-
olistic power, etc.). These distortions cause a wedge between the wage rate
and the marginal cost of providing additional labour. An expected rise in
labour demand by ￿rms will be met by workers as long as this wedge remains
positive.
Consistently with the assumption made in Section 2.2, the long run
supply is inelastic so that ￿ lr = 0, and hence employment growth is simply
given by the aggregation of (6):
lr = pr + yr ￿ wr: (13)
The optimal wage rate is, therefore, the one which clears the labour market
in expectation. Abstracting from demographic factors, labour supply is
assumed to be perfectly inelastic in the long run, so that E (lr) = 0 and,
hence, E (yr) = E (ar).
The optimising growth rate of nominal wage consistent with (12) is equal
14
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wr = E (pr + yr): (14)
One of the features of this two country, two sector model is that we can
derive the Lucas aggregate supply curve. In fact, given (5), (13) and (14),
one can derive output growth:15
yr = ￿ yr + ￿r (pr ￿ Epr) + "r; (15)
where ￿ yr ￿ E (yr) = E (ar) is the natural growth rate of the economy,
￿r ￿ ￿r=(1 ￿ ￿r) is the slope of the Lucas AS curve, "r ￿ (ar ￿ Ear)=(1 ￿












2.5 Decomposing the real exchange rate
In order to isolate the BS e⁄ect, we decompose the change in the real ex-
change rate (11) between its non-deterministic ￿s = ￿(￿h ￿ ￿f), and deter-
ministic component:
























r = 0. Under these hypotheses, if the small open economy experiences
larger intersectoral productivity growth in favour of the tradable sector rel-
ative to the large country, then the home economy experiences trend ap-
preciation of its real exchange rate E (s) < 0. This result is the second
standard proposition of the BS model. In the more general case, this im-
pact on E (s) is reinforced (or o⁄set), depending on whether the tradable
15This generalisation of the Lucas supply curve to two sectors establishes the link be-
tween the BS and time inconsistency frameworks.
15
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 445
February 2005sector in the home economy is smaller (or larger) relative to the foreign
economy, i.e. ￿h < ￿f (or ￿h > ￿f). This in turn depends on the respective
consumer preferences in the two countries. The BS e⁄ect is also reinforced if
the catching up economy experiences price convergence in the tradable sec-





< 0. In light of the empirical
evidence and for ease of exposition we henceforth assume that catching up
economies experience a real appreciation process, i.e. E (s) < 0:
Turning to the non-deterministic component of the real exchange rate,
it is straightforward to see that ￿s is determined either by shocks to inter-
sectoral productivity, aggregate demand or PPP.16 In particular, under the
plausible assumption that bN
r > bT
r , a positive aggregate demand shock in
the catching up economy temporarily strengthens its real exchange rate.17
The model is at this point complete and can be solved in the context of
a general equilibrium analysis, as (1), (2), (3), (4), (6) and (14) determines
the following variables: yr, pr, pi
r, yi
r, li




the nominal exchange rate.
16Comparative statics will be carried out under the hypothesis that the other shock is
invariant. For example, if a productivity shock hits both the traded and non-traded sectors
with the same magnitude, then ￿r = 0 and ￿r 6= 0. Conversely, if a positive productivity
shock in the traded sector is o⁄set by a negative productivity shock in the non-traded
sector, then ￿r 6= 0 and ￿r = 0. Obviously, if shocks to demand and/or PPP occurs, then
￿r 6= 0 and ￿r = 0.
17One could - but this is beyond the scope of this analysis - attempt to include more
formally the notion of market segmentation and terms of trade e⁄ects. For example,
Benigno and Thornissen (2003) show by means of numerical simulations that an increase
in total factor productivity in the traded sector would have a depreciating impact on the
real exchange rate through the market segmentation channel, which captures the e⁄ects
of local currency pricing. Opposing to this, the internal real exchange rate shows an
appreciating trend in accordance with the BS e⁄ect. These e⁄ects tend to o⁄set each
other in the long run. NOEM models can also be reconciled with the BS e⁄ect if pricing
to market is postulated (see Bergin, 2001; Vilagi, 2004).
16
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 445
February 20053 In￿ ation, output and welfare under di⁄erent regimes.
















b yr, in the ￿ exible exchange rate regime






r is de￿ned as the level of admissible in￿ ation in country r. We also
assume that ￿r > 0, hence capturing the hypothesis of a positive impact of
currency unions on the natural rate of output, as suggested among others
by Rose (2000, 2001, 2004), Edwards and Magendzo (2003) and Bagella et
al. (2004).
Since the level of potential output is endogenous to the formation of the
currency union, the Lucas AS curve can be re-written as
yr = ￿ yr + ￿r (pr ￿ Epr) + "r: (19)
The policy makers in minimising their loss functions take as given (19),
expected in￿ ation by the private sector and the realised shocks. Events un-
fold as follows: the private sector forms expectations on prices, conditionally
on the information available at that time. The output shock is realized and,
￿nally, monetary policy is set. The game is solved by backward induction.
In what follows we consider two cases:
1. the small open economy h retains monetary sovereignty and full dis-
cretionality by adopting ￿ exible exchange rates;
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impact on welfare.
3.1 Flexible exchange rates
We assume that the central bank controls in￿ ation directly. Minimisation
of (17) given (9), (10) and (19) with respect to pr yields the typical Nash-




















"r = E ("r)
2 : Moreover, the reduced form of traded goods in￿ ation
and exchange rate dynamics can be computed as follows:
pT
f = p￿



















This means that the deterministic change to structural in￿ ation (e.g. the BS
e⁄ect) does not have an impact on realised in￿ ation, unless it is implicitly
incorporated when evaluating the level of admissible in￿ ation. Moreover, in-
￿ ation and output performance do not depend on real exchange rate shocks.
The latter only a⁄ect tradable in￿ ation and developments in the nominal
exchange rate.
3.2 Monetary union
Let us assume now that the small open economy h and the large economy
f form a monetary union. The new established monetary authority takes
policy decisions focusing the economic analysis on union-wide in￿ ation and
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aggregate union-wide output, pu ￿ mph + (1 ￿ m)pf the aggregate union-
wide in￿ ation, pu￿
the level of admissible in￿ ation and ￿ yu ￿ m(b yh + ￿h) +
(1 ￿ m)(b yf + ￿f) the potential output rate, with m indicating the weight of
the small open economy h.18
Di⁄erentiating (20) with respect to the common tradable in￿ ation rate
pT
f , determines the reaction function of the monetary authority as a function
of in￿ ationary expectations. By imposing rational expectations one can
derive expected in￿ ation. Finally, the equilibrium outcome is achieved by





["u ￿ m(1 ￿ m)(￿h ￿ ￿f)￿s],
pu
h = p￿
















where ￿u = m￿h + (1 ￿ m)￿f; "u = m"h + (1 ￿ m)"f;￿h = pu￿
￿ p￿
h +
(1 ￿ m)E (￿h ￿ ￿f) and ￿f = pu￿
￿ p￿
f ￿ mE (￿h ￿ ￿f)
It is noticeable that expected in￿ ation in the enlarged currency area is
not a⁄ected by deterministic changes in the real exchange rate. However,
aggregate in￿ ation is a⁄ected by real exchange rate shocks if ￿h 6= ￿f. To
be more precise a shock appreciating the real exchange rate in the catching
up economy, ￿s < 0; would have a positive (negative) impact on aggregate
in￿ ation if ￿h < ￿f (￿h > ￿f). This implies that if the transmission mech-
anism of monetary policy di⁄ers among member states, shocks to the real
exchange rate, whether the consequence of a relative productivity, aggregate
18Benigno (2004) shows - in a NOEM context with tradable goods only - that, if the two
regions share the same degree of nominal rigidity, the terms of trade are completely insu-
lated from monetary policy and the optimal outcome is obtained by targeting a weighted
average of the regional in￿ ation rates. These weights coincide with the economic sizes of
the region. Benigno￿ s framework also delivers a simple welfare criterion based on the utility
of the consumers that has the usual trade-o⁄ between stabilizing in￿ ation and output.
19
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Moreover, ￿s < 0 leads to higher in￿ ation in country h and lower in country
f.
The impact of the formation of the currency union on expected in￿ ation
in country r is captured by the parameter ￿r: For any given level of pu￿
,
deterministic changes in the real exchange rate (e.g. BS e⁄ect or increased
consumer preferences in favour of nontradables) bring about a relatively
small downward impact on in￿ ation in the large country and a relatively
large upward impact on the small country.
Suppose that pu￿
is determined endogenously by minimising e Lu = mLh+
(1 ￿ m)Lf; where Lh and Lf represent the respective loss functions of h and
f. Then pu￿
is equal to mp￿
h+(1 ￿ m)p￿
f:19 Let us consider two special cases.
If we postulate that admissible in￿ ation is the same in the two countries,
i.e. p￿
h = p￿
f, the small economy h experiences a rise in in￿ ation equal to
￿h = (1 ￿ m)E (￿h ￿ ￿f) while the large economy f experiences a decline
in in￿ ation amounting to ￿f = ￿mE (￿h ￿ ￿f):20 In this case, the costs of
higher in￿ ation due to the deterministic factors a⁄ecting the real exchange
rate are internalised and, consequently, the optimal redistribution of in￿ a-
tion calls for lower in￿ ation in the large country f.
If we postulate instead that the di⁄erence in admissible in￿ ation between
the small and the large country is equal to the corresponding di⁄erence in
structural in￿ ation, i.e. p￿
h￿p￿
f = E (￿h ￿ ￿f), then joining a monetary union
has no impact on expected in￿ ation in the two countries as ￿h = ￿f = 0.
Finally, this analysis allows us to study also the properties of output









m￿h+(1￿m)￿f E (￿h ￿ ￿f)
20For example, if the deterministic appreciation of the real exchange rate is equal to
1% and the joining country weighs 10% in terms of GDP, the in￿ ationary impact for the
small open economy is equal to 0.9%,while the de￿ ationary impact for the large economy
will be equal to 0.1%.
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yu = yu +
￿
￿u2 + ￿
["u ￿ m(1 ￿ m)(￿h ￿ ￿f)￿s],
yu












￿f (￿h￿u + ￿)
￿u2 + ￿
m￿s.
One can see how, di⁄erently from the case of ￿ exible exchange rates, real
exchange rate shocks have real e⁄ects in the case of currency unions.
With regard to aggregate welfare, using the reduced form for in￿ ation
and output, under the hypothesis that "r are orthogonal to ￿s, the expected


















"h +(1 ￿ m)
2 ￿2
"f +2m(1 ￿ m)￿"h"f and ￿2
￿ is the variance
of the real exchange rate shock.
The above expression reveals that the expected loss of the currency union
is not a function of the deterministic factors a⁄ecting the real exchange rate,
but rather of the variances and covariances of shocks. The presence of a
member undergoing structural change could have therefore negative welfare
implications for the currency union as a whole, to the extent that this is
re￿ ected in high variances of aggregate supply shocks, ￿2
"h. This is subject,
however, to an important quali￿cation. These variances are weighted by
the square of the size of each participant to the union. Thus, a relatively
high variance of shocks in one country has a limited impact on the union
insofar as this country is not too large. It is also interesting to note that the
smaller the covariance between supply shocks, the smaller the aggregate loss.
The intuition behind this result is that the less supply shocks are correlated
among each other, the more they tend to o⁄set at the union level. Finally, a
21
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￿ determines a negative welfare
impact on the currency union. The size of this impact will be the greater the
more the participants to the common currency area di⁄er in supply structure
(i.e. di⁄erent transmission mechanisms of monetary policy), as measured by
the wedge ￿h ￿ ￿f, and the more the two countries are similar in size.
4 Welfare implications at country level
If a currency union is formed, under the hypothesis that aggregate and real
exchange rate shocks are orthogonal to each other, the respective expected















































e = (1 ￿ m)
2 ￿u2
￿ + (￿ + m￿h￿u)
2 > 0,








￿ + [￿ + (1 ￿ m)￿f￿u]
2 > 0;






l = (1 ￿ m)






r = 2(1 ￿ m)
2 ￿u f￿ [￿h + m(￿h ￿ ￿f)] + ￿h￿f￿ug > 0 if ￿h > ￿f;
v = 2m2￿u f￿ [￿f + (1 ￿ m)(￿f ￿ ￿h)] + ￿h￿f￿ug > 0 if ￿h < ￿f:
The above equations show that the expected losses in the two countries
are a positive function of the variances ￿2
￿h;￿2
￿f;￿2
￿. They are instead a
negative function of the covariance of supply shocks, ￿"h"f if the monetary
transmission mechanism is the same across countries ( ￿h = ￿f). If instead
￿h < ￿f (￿h > ￿f), the welfare impact of a change in the covariance of
22
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mechanism a⁄ects the impact of asymmetric supply shocks on the countries
participating to a currency union. Finally, the variance of foreign supply
as well as real exchange rate shocks have a greater impact on the domestic
economy the smaller it is, as d and f are scaled by a factor of m2 while h
and l by a factor of (1 ￿ m)
2.
The expected losses of countries h and f are also an increasing func-
tion of ￿h and ￿f: Therefore, under the assumption that p￿
h = p￿
f, the
expected loss is an increasing function of the deterministic change in the
real exchange rate, weighted by the size of the partner country in the cur-
rency union. Under the alternative assumption that p￿
h ￿ p￿
f = E (￿h ￿ ￿f),
this deterministic component has instead no impact on the two countries￿
welfare, as ￿h = ￿f = 0.
To compare the welfare of a country between the ￿ exible and currency
union regime, we take into account the positive impact that currency unions
may have on potential output.21 To this aim, we consider the social loss
function b Lr = 1





u)2, where the desired output rate y￿
r
is equal to the natural rate of output in the currency union regime, b yr +￿r.




= E (Lr) + ￿2
r=2 in






r) in the case of a










, if the gain in potential output ￿r dominates the costs (i)
of an ine¢ cient response to domestic and foreign shocks and (ii) the inability
of setting in￿ ation at the level prevailing before monetary union (if ￿r 6= 0).
To get further insights on the role of shocks, consider the simplifying
assumption that ￿h = ￿f = 0 and ￿h = ￿f = ￿. In this case, it is optimal
21In this analysis for simplicity we abstract from the possibility that increased trade
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determin n i ate.to form a monetary union for country h and country f, if respectively:


































It is also useful to decompose ￿2
￿h + ￿2








￿"h￿"f, where ￿"h"f is de￿ned as the correlation coe¢ cient
of supply shocks: This decomposition shows that the costs of currency unions
are an increasing function of the di⁄erence in the standard deviations of sup-
ply shocks, ￿"h ￿￿"h and a decreasing function of the correlation coe¢ cient,
￿"h"f: The optimality conditions (21) and (22) hold as long as the gain in
potential output, ￿r, is su¢ ciently large. More speci￿cally, ￿r must be the
larger:
(i) the smaller the country;
(ii) the larger the di⁄erence between the standard deviations of supply
shocks, ￿"h ￿ ￿"h;
(iii) the smaller the correlation of supply shocks, ￿"h"f
(iv) the larger the variance of real exchange rate shocks ￿2
￿;
In the limit case when ￿2
￿h = ￿2
￿f; ￿"h"f = 1 and ￿2
￿ = 0, the optimality
condition is reduced simply to ￿r > 0:
On the other hand, countries characterised by sizeable asymmetric shocks
(for example ￿"h"f = 0 and ￿2
￿ > 0) may still bene￿t from joining a currency
union if the potential output gain is su¢ ciently large.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has assessed the role that the exchange rate regime plays in
a small open economy on the basis of a two-sector, two-countries general
equilibrium model incorporating explicitly the deterministic changes in the
24
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and the role played by aggregate as well as real exchange rate shocks.
The paper has found that, if ￿ exible exchange rates are retained, ex-
pected in￿ ation in the small open economy does not depend on the trend
appreciation of the real exchange rate, unless this is implicitly incorporated
in the level of admissible in￿ ation. At the same time, the nominal exchange
rate is expected to appreciate, as a result of the intersectoral productiv-
ity growth di⁄erential, possibly reinforced by the process of convergence in
tradable in￿ ation.
The paper has also shown that if a currency union is formed, the ex-
pected loss of the common currency area does not depend on the determin-
istic factors a⁄ecting the real exchange rate (such as the Balassa-Samuelson
e⁄ect or relative changes in consumer preferences) but only on the variance-
covariance matrix of supply shocks. Moreover, if the transmission mecha-
nisms di⁄er among member states, the expected loss of the common currency
area depends on the variance of real exchange rate shocks (i.e. intersectoral
productivity, aggregate demand and purchasing power parity shocks).
Therefore, the presence of members undergoing structural change may
have negative welfare implications for the common currency union to the
extent this is re￿ ected in high variances of aggregate supply and real ex-
change rate shocks. There is, however, an important quali￿cation to be
made. These variances are weighted by the square of the size of each partic-
ipant to the union. Thus, a relatively high variance of shocks in one country
has a limited impact on the union insofar as this country is not too large.
The paper has also found that the smaller the covariance of aggregate sup-
ply shocks between the two countries, the smaller the aggregate loss. The
intuition for this is that the less supply shocks are correlated, the more they
tend to o⁄set each other at the union level.
At the country level, the welfare implications of renouncing to an inde-
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February 2005pendent monetary policy are indeterminate, as the suboptimal response to
domestic and foreign shocks and the inability of setting in￿ ation at the de-
sired level may be more than compensated by higher potential output. This
notwithstanding, it may be bene￿cial to join a currency union as long as
the gain in potential output is su¢ ciently large. Under the simplifying as-
sumption that the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy is the same
between the two countries, the gain in potential output must be the larger,
the smaller the country, the larger the di⁄erence between the standard de-
viation of supply shocks in the two participating countries, the smaller the
correlation of supply shocks and the larger the variance of real exchange rate
shocks. Therefore a country characterised by sizeable asymmetric shocks
may still bene￿t from joining a currency union, if the potential output gain
is su¢ ciently large.
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